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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final Judgment by Default and 
from an Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment by the 
Honorable Robert C. Gibson of the Fifth Circuit Court, County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, Salt Lake Department. Jurisdiction is 
based on Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and 
Utah Pules of Civil Procedure § 78-4-11. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A 
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT TO PLAINTIFF AND IN 
REFUSING TO SET ASIDE SUCH DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT, WHERE DEFENDANT HAD ANSWERED 
AND DILIGENTLY PURSUED THE MATTER BUT ARRIVED 
LATE FOR THE TRIAL, AND PLAINTIFF PRESENTED NO 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ANY ALLEGATIONS IN THE 
UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT. 
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RULES 
U.R.C.P. Rule 55(b), 
(b) Judgment 
Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(2) By the Court, 
In all other cases the party entitled to a judqment 
by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to 
enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it 
is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of 
damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or 
to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may 
conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems 
necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting Aside Default. 
For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry 
of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may 
likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b). 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly 
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed 
to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judqment should 
have prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifyinq 
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or 
(4), not more than three months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision 
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This Rule does not limit the power of a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judg-
ment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judqment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaininq any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these Rules or by an 
independent action. 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action began in October of 1984f and involves a 
dispute over services rendered by Defendantf Mr. Harrison. Mr. 
Harrison answered Plaintiff's unverified complaint, stated the 
existence of several meritorious defenses and the parties 
thereafter engaged in discovery. The documents on file show that 
Mr. Harrison has diligently sought to pursue his defenses in this 
matter. Notice of the trial in this matter on January 5, 1987, 
did not reach Mr. Harrison until the day of trial and then by 
telephone call from his teenaged daughter.* At that time Mr. 
Harrison was out of town and immediately returned to appear for 
the trial, but arrived late. The court clerk told Mr. Harrison, 
as shown by minute entry (see Addendum Exhibit "A"), no default 
had been entered and that the matter had been continued. 
Defendant also learned that Plaintiff had appeared, but he had 
not been prepared with evidence, presented no evidence, and his 
Motion for Judgment was denied. 
On January 26, 1987, a private meeting was held between 
Plaintiff's counsel and Judge Gibson. Mr. Harrison was unaware 
1 
Mr. Harrison normally receives his mail at a business box 
number. The notice of trial setting was sent to his home 
address. Mr. Harrison rarely checks the mail at his home 
address. His daughter routinely receives the mail at the 
home address. She failed to recognize the importance of the 
Notice of Trial Setting and failed to inform Mr. Harrison 
until the day set for trial. 
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that this meeting was being held, and notice thereof was never 
sent to him. At that meeting, Plaintiff's counsel presented and 
discussed a Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion for 
Default Judgment. Mr. Harrison was not provided with a copy and 
was unaware of the memorandum prior to this meeting. Judge 
Gibson granted the motion and entered Default Judgment on that 
date. Addendum Exhibit "B". Thereafter, Mr. Harrison learned of 
the judgment for the first time when he received a copy of the 
Notice of Judgment from Plaintiff's counsel. 
Mr. Harrison immediately took action to set aside the 
Default Judgment by filing a motion and affidavit in support 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Mr. Harrison 
acted with due diligence in pursuing the matter upon his dis-
covery of this mistake. A hearing was held on Mr. Harrison's 
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment on March 18, 1987. The 
court found that Mr. Harrison had failed to use due diligence 
prior to the trial, and that there was no excusable neqlect 
excusing him for failing to appear for the trial. Motion to set 
Aside was Denied. Addendum Exhibit nCM. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) provides that on motion, the court 
may, in the furtherance of justice, relieve a party from a final 
judgment for excusable neglect. Utah case law has interpreted 
this rule liberally to effect the overall goal of affording 
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litigants their day in court, when it is clear that the claims 
are in dispute and the Defendant is diligent in pursuing his 
rights. The interests of justice and fair play place judgments by 
default in disfavor in our law, particularly under facts and 
circumstances such as those presented in this case where Plain-
tiff presented no evidence in support of the claims in his 
unverified complaint. For these reasons, the circuit court erred 
in granting a default judgment and in subsequently refusing to 
set it aside for good cause shown, as provided in U.R.C.P. Rule 
55(c). 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTE EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
UNDER U.R.C.P. 60 (b)(1) 
"The uniformally acknowledged policy of the law is to 
accord litigants the opportunity for a hearing on the merits, 
where that can be done without serious injustice to the other 
party." Interstate Excavating v. Agla Development, 611 P.2d 369 
(Utah 1980). For that reason the courts are indulqent towards 
the setting aside of default judgments where reasonable justifi-
cation or excuse for the Defendant's failure to appear exists and 
where timely application to set it aside is made. Where there is 
doubt about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of doing so. In this way the matter 
may be resolved in accordance with equity, law and justice. 
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Interstate Excavatingy Id, These principles are particularly 
applicable to the present case where Plaintiff presented no 
evidence in support of its case. Thereforef there is no oppor-
tunity for serious injustice to be done to Plaintiff by requiring 
him to present his side of the controversy, at a properly noticed 
hearing. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Interstate Excavating, Id., 
was dealing with facts similar to ours. Therein, Defendant had 
answered and asserted various defenses to Plaintiff's claim. 
Following the withdrawal of Defendant's counsel, a notice of the 
trial setting was mailed to Defendant, who did not receive it. 
More favorably for Plaintiff than in our case, however, the 
Plaintiff therein did present evidence in support of its case 
before being awarded a default judgment. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court was impressed that immediately upon learning of the 
judgment, Defendant proceeded diligently with efforts to set it 
aside and contest the issues on the merits. The Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court's refusal to set aside the default 
judgment under U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b), further finding that the 
interests of justice would be best served thereby. The Supreme 
Court cited Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 
P.2d 951 (1962) which also involved the setting aside of a 
default judgment. Mayhew noted that: 
"the court ... should be generally indul-
qent toward permitting full inquiry and 
knowledge of disputes so they can be 
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settled advisedly and in conformity with 
law and justice. To clamp a judgment 
rigidly and irrevocably on a party without 
a hearing is obviously a harsh and oppres-
sive thing. It is fundamental in our 
system of justice that each party to a 
controversy should be afforded an opportun-
ity to present his side of the case. For 
that reason it is quite uniformly regarded 
as an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where there is 
reasonable justification or excuse for the 
defendant's failure to appear, and timely 
application is made to set it aside." Id. 
at 952. 
The party's conduct is also an important fact for the 
court to review when resolving doubts in favor of the party 
moving to set aside a default judgment. For example, in Helgesen 
v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981) the Supreme Court found 
that the lower court had abused its discretion in refusing to set 
aside a default judgment. The Plaintiff's attorney and Defen-
dant's insurance adjuster had been in frequent contact with each 
other for months regarding the claims, and Plaintiff knew that 
Defendant intended to defend the actions, but proceeded to have a 
default judgment entered without so little as a phone call to the 
Defendant's adjuster. The court was appalled that Plaintiff did 
this with full knowledge of the Defendant's position and did not 
have the courtesy to contact and make an inquiry. The court 
concluded that Defendant was not guilty of lack of diligence and 
that his actions constituted a mistake and excusable neglect 
under U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b). The court found this to be a case 
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where the strict procedural rules "must yield to a more basic 
rule of fundamental fairness." Id. at 1082. 
A question over the mailing of notices was at issue in 
May v. Thompson, 677 P. 2d 1109 (Utah 1984), wherein the Supreme 
Court again found the trial court's decision to be arbitrary and 
vacated a default judgment. The rule of balancing equities, the 
hardship to the Defendant, and the need to serve the ends of 
justice were cited as reasons for the court's decision. 
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY 
REQUIRE THAT THE JUDGMENT BE SET ASIDE 
Judgments by default are not favored by the courts, nor 
are they in the interests of justice and fair play. Heathman v. 
Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P. 2d 189 (Utah 1962). Those interests 
have been particularly harmed here, where no evidence was 
presented in support of Plaintiff's claim, vigorously contested 
by Mr. Harrison. Fair play apparently was forgotten when the 
lower court, initially hesitating to grant judqment based on no 
supporting evidence, then granted judgment pursuant to arguments 
presented by Plaintiff's counsel in a private meetinq with the 
judge. Mr. Harrison was given no notice of this meeting and was 
provided no advance copy of such memorandum. There was no 
opportunity for his arguments to be heard in opposition to 
Plaintiff's memorandum. The unfairness of this is emphasized by 
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the inapplicability of the one out of state case relied upon by 
Plaintiff's counsel in support of his contention that a default 
could be entered without proving Plaintiff's case. 
Firstr Plaintiff admitted in his memorandum that there 
are no Utah cases in support of his motion and that various 
courts had held to the contrary. Second, the one Montana case 
relied upon by Plaintiff, Archer v. La March Creek Ranch, 571 
P.2d 379 (MT 1977) is easily distinguishable. In Archer, the 
defaulted corporate Defendant did not attempt to attend the trial 
and apparently there was no reasonable explanation given for such 
failure to appear. Excusable neglect was not at issue. However, 
at trial both oral and documentary evidence was introduced by 
another party in support of the same affirmative defenses raised 
by the corporation. Reviewing each of those defenses, the court 
found that the burden of proof had not been carried. 
The Utah rule was well stated in Heathman, supra at 190, 
where Plaintiff complained of the court's setting aside of his 
default against Defendant based on Defendant's excusable neglect 
under U.R.C.P. Rules 55(c) and 60(b). The court indicated once 
again the strong jurisprudential disfavor towards judgments by 
default: 
"No one has an inalienable or constitu-
tional right to a judgment by default 
without a hearing on the merits. The 
courts, in the interest of justice and fair 
play, favor, where possible, a full and 
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complete opportunity for a hearing on the 
merits of every case." 
GOOD CAUSE EXISTS UNDER U.R.C.P. RULE 55 
TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
U.R.C.P. Rule 55(c) provides that for good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default. The facts of this 
case do present sufficient good cause justifying the setting 
aside of the default judgment and the lower court erred in 
refusing to do so. 
In Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed a default judgment, due to the trial 
court's failure to follow the strict guidelines of U.R.C.P. Rule 
55(b)(2) prescribing the procedures to be followed by trial 
courts in entertaining judgments against defaulting parties. 
"Courts are not at liberty to deviate from those rules [governing 
default judgments] just because one party is in default and is 
not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case." Russell, 
Id. at 1195. Therein, the court had a much less sympathetic 
Defendant, inasmuch as Defendant filed no answer and had stated 
with indifference that he felt no legal obligation to respond to 
Plaintiff's claims. Those statements negated, in the court's 
opinion, the requisite diligence in actively defending against 
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Plaintiff's claims. Mr. Harrisonfs actions, in sharp contrast, 
show his diligence in actively defending against Plaintiff's 
claims. Under these circumstances, he should not be punished 
with a default judgment brought about by one, inadvertent, 
excusable mistake. 
Under U.R.C.P. Rule 55(b)(2), it was also necessary for 
the court to determine the amount of damages and establish the 
truth of the averments in the complaint by the taking of evidence 
at the hearing. Failure to do so constitutes additional good 
cause for setting aside the entry of default. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the Utah jurisprudence disfavoring judgments 
by default and favoring a hearing on the merits in contested 
matters, Defendant - Appellant urges this Court to reverse the 
circuit court's Judgment by Default and to set aside such default 
judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect under U.R.C.P. Rule 
60(b)(1). 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of May, 1987. 
BTE^B^^^SIAM, & HATCH 
JfTZane Gill 
Ann Wise 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
D O C K E T 
FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT - SLC 
Case : 845102950 CV Civil 
Case Title: 
WILLIAMS MICHAEL VS HARRISON" M CHRIS 
Page 1 
WEDNESDAY JANUARY 7, 1987 
9:48 AM 
Filing Date: 11/01/84 
Cause of Action: 
Amount of Suit.: $ . 00 
Return Date.. . . . : 
Judgment : Date: Amt: $. 00 
Disposition....: Date: 
Court Set: TRIAL on 01/05/87 at 0930 A in room ? with RCG 
No Tracking Activity. 
No Accounts Payable Activity, 
Party..: PLA Plaintiff 
Name...: 
WILLIAMS MICHAEL 
Home Phone.: ( ) Work Phone.: ( ) 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name...: 
HARRISON M CHRIS 
Home Phone.: ( ) Work Phone.: ( ) 
02/25/86 Case converted from SLC system... Civil file date 11/01/84. SLC 
I 10/17/86 FILED NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL (DEFENDANT) MRS 
I 10/27/86 FILED NOTICE TO APPEAR IN PERSON OR APPOINT OTHER COUNSEL MRS 
I 11/05/86 FILED REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING NMD 
11/18/86 TRL scheduled for 1/ 5/87 at 9:30 A in room ? with RCG NMD 
01/05/87 GIBSON/CKO T870002 C44 PLAINTIFF PRESENT THRU ATTY ROBERT LORD. CK0 
DEFENDANT NOT PRESENT. PLAINTIFF NOT PREPARED WITH EVIDENCE. CK0 
I PLAINTIFFS ATTY MOTION FOR JUDGMENT C/0 MOTION DENIED CKO 
End of the docket report for this case. 
EXHIBIT _ A 
JUDGMEN^TBY DEFAULT 
Civil N Q / 8 4 ~ C V - 1 0 2 9 5 
ROBERT L. LORD 
Utah State Bar No. 1994 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
444 Metropolitan Law Building 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4241 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, 
. • . Plaintiff, 
vs. 
M. CHRIS HARRISON, 
. . . Defendant. 
—oooOooo—• 
The above entitled matter came bn regularly for trial before the 
undersigned, one of the judges of the above entitled court, on the 5 th day of 
January, 1987, at the hour of 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff appeared by and through his 
attorney, Robert L. Lord. No one appeared on behalf of the defendant, whereupon 
counsel for the plaintiff moved for judgment pursuant to the prayer of the 
complaint on file herein. 
The Court, having considered the motion of the plaintiff, together with 
the memorandum in support thereof, having examined the files and records herein, 
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, hereby finds that the 
plaintiff is entitled to a return of the $2,100 advance fees paid to the defendant for 
failure of the defendant to provide services as agreed. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises 
aforesaid, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said plaintiff do 
have and recover from the defendant, the sum of $2,100, interest thereon at the 
rate of 10% per annum from December 15, 1983, in the sum of $647.50, together 
with plaintiff's costs and disbursement incurred in this action amounting to the sum 
EXHIBIT & 
37-J22W/J 
of $30.00, making a total judgment of $2,777.50, all to bear interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum from the date hereof till paid. 
DATED this ^L day of January 1987. 
BY THE COU£TJ 
Circuit Court Judge 
2 
ROBERT U LORD MAR 2 3 1287 
Utah State Bar No, 1994 
Attorney for Plaintiff
 D.n c LIAPI .., * ii^ru 
444 Metropolitan Law Building BlELF- HASLAfj & U C r i 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8*111 
Telephone: 328-4241 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 84-CV-10295 
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, 
• « 
VS. 
M. CHRIS HARRISON, 
• 4 
. . Plaintiff, 
. . Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
—oooOooo— 
The defendant's motion to set aside default judgment came on regularly 
for hearing before the undersigned, one of the judges of the above entitled court, 
on the 18th day of March, 1987. Plaintiff was represented by his attorney, Robert 
L. Lord* Defendant was present in court and represented by his attorney, L. Zane 
Gill. 
The Court, having reviewed the files and records herein, having weighed 
and considered the affidavits submitted in supf>brt and opposition to the motion 
together with the representations and arguments of counsel, finding that the 
defendant had failed to use due diligence prior to the trial, and that there was no 
excusable neglect excusing him for failing to appear for the trial, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the defendant's motion be, and the same hereby is, denied. 
DATED this day of March 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
Robert C* Gibson 
Circuit Court 3udge 
39-M20WH-O EXHIBIT C-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, 
this date of March 20, 1987, to L. Zane Gill, attorney for defendant, 50 West 
Broadway, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 8410L 
y?\ 
Carol 3." Lord"- Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, by placing the same in the 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, on this 26th day of May, 1987, addressed as 
follows: 
Robert L. Lord 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
444 Metropolitan Law Building 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, OT 84111 
